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Systems Thinking, Big Data, and Data Protection Law 
Using Ackoff’s Interactive Planning to Respond to Emergent Policy 
Challenges 
 
Henry Pearce* 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the emergence of big data and how it poses a number of significant novel 
challenges to the smooth operation of some of the European data protection framework’s 
fundamental tenets. Building on previous research in the area, the article argues that recent 
proposals for reform in this area, as well as proposals based on conventional approaches to 
policy making and regulatory design more generally, will likely be ill-equipped to deal with 
some of big data’s most severe emergent difficulties. Instead, it is argued that novel, and 
possibly unorthodox, approaches to regulation and policy design premised on systems thinking 
methodologies may represent attractive and alternative ways forward. As a means of testing 
this general hypothesis, the article considers Interactive Planning, a systems thinking 
methodology popularized by the organizational theorist Russel Ackoff, as a particular 
embryonic example of one such methodological approach, and, using the challenges posed by 
big data to the principle of purpose limitation as a case study, explores whether its usage may 
be beneficial in the development of data protection law and policy in the big data environment. 
 
Keywords: Big data, data protection, data minimization, systems thinking, interactive 
planning. 
 
A Introduction 
 
This article represents an attempt to build on a previously published article in which it was 
suggested that rather than relying on conventional policy-making logic to respond to some of 
most serious regulatory challenges linked to the emergence of big data, European regulators 
might better be served by pursuing novel and possibly unorthodox approaches to designing and 
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implementing data protection law and policy in the emerging big data environment.1 Here, it 
was argued that approaches to policy making premised on systems thinking methodologies 
may represent a particularly promising avenue of enquiry. This article examines this notion in 
greater detail and, with a particular focus on the practice known as ‘Interactive Planning’, 
further makes the case for systems thinking, and its associated methodologies, to be 
incorporated into the shaping of data protection law and policy in the big data regulatory 
environment. Accordingly, though throughout the course of the article certain specific 
emergent regulatory problems linked to big data are considered, with one in particular being 
considered in some detail, it is not necessarily the article’s primary intention to advance 
definitive solutions to any of the challenges mentioned. While some embryonic ideas for future 
regulatory frameworks are suggested, the primary objective of the article is to highlight the 
potential of Interactive Planning, as one prominent example of a systems thinking 
methodology, as a methodological means of improving the design and implementation of data 
protection law, policy, and regulation in the big data environment. 
The article’s structure is as follows. First, the emergence of the phenomenon of big data 
is considered, and it is explained how, despite its considerable potential for good, it raises a 
number of notable regulatory concerns, some of which give rise to serious, possibly 
fundamental, reservations about the continued suitability of some of the European data 
protection framework’s core tenets. Second, the concept of systems thinking is introduced, and 
it is explained why, in the big data environment, the use of systems thinking methodologies 
may be suitable for deployment as a means of responding to emergent policy challenges. 
Following this, as a case in point, the systems thinking methodology of Interactive Planning, 
popularized by the American organizational theorist Russell Ackoff, is outlined as an example 
of one such methodology that may be of particular use in this context. The final substantive 
section of the article then, using the challenges faced by the principle of data minimization – 
central tenet of the European data protection framework, as a case study, deploys the Interactive 
Planning methodology outlined in the previous section as a means of demonstrating the 
potential of systems thinking as a tool for designing regulation in the big data environment. 
Some suggestions as to how the policy and regulatory challenges identified might be responded 
to are then advanced. 
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B Big Data 
 
Generally speaking, big data can be considered a loosely defined term, which is broadly used 
to describe data sets that are so large and complex that they have become awkward to work 
with using standard statistical software, or data which are too large to be stored, managed, or 
analysed in a single organization.2 Essentially, the existence of such data sets is made possible 
by the unprecedented, and exponentially increasing, amount of data produced and put into 
circulation in the world today.3 As noted by boyd4 and Crawford, however, big data is in many 
ways a poor term. In their words, there is little doubt that the quantities of data now available 
in the world are often huge, but that is not the defining feature of this new data ecosystem.5 Big 
data, in fact, is less about data that are big, and more about increased capacities to search, 
aggregate, and cross-reference large data sets.6 Working with data sets of such extraordinary 
size and scale allows for those in possession of sophisticated analytical tools to identify 
patterns, and make inferences and predictions that would not have previously been possible 
when working with data sets of a smaller size. Quite often this will entail data that have been 
collected for a specific purpose being repurposed to serve an entirely different end. The types 
of scenarios that would fall within these categories can range drastically, from data derived 
from vast international science projects, such as the Large Hadron Collider of the European 
Organization for Nuclear Research, to the wealth of data collated by online companies such as 
Facebook and Google.7 
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While big data’s latent value is seemingly huge, and its uses are likely to lead to a 
significant number of benefits, both social and economic in nature, it has also been noted that 
certain big data analytics operations may also be capable of causing harmful and undesirable 
consequences for individuals, and thus they require regulation. In particular, automated-
algorithmic profiling, a key constituent part of many big data analytics operations, has been 
identified as having the potential to lead to discriminatory practices and the diminution of 
individual autonomy.8 Significantly, in this regard, it is important to note that many big data 
analytics operations will involve the processing of personal data of individuals, and so will fall 
under the jurisdiction of the European data protection framework.9 Troublingly, however, the 
emergence of big data has presented significant, perhaps insurmountable, challenges for the 
smooth operation of this framework. In particular, there are concerns that, as traditionally 
envisaged, the concepts of personal data, informed consent, and, as will be considered in much 
greater detail below, the principle of data minimization, all central tenets of the data protection 
framework, are no longer fit for purpose. Accordingly, European regulators and policy makers 
are now being put to task to find fresh policy options, which will allow for a number of 
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negotiations on the overhaul of European data protection rules to a close. See European Parliament, ‘Data 
Protection Reform – Parliament Approves New Rules Fit for the Digital Era’, 2016, available at: 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160407IPR21776/Data-protection-reform-Parliament-
approves-new-rules-fit-for-the-digital-era> (last accessed September 2016) 
fundamental tenets and key underlying principles of data protection law to be modernized and 
brought into alignment with the practical realities of contemporary data-handling practices. 
Given the apparent novelty of big data’s challenges, it has been suggested that big data’s 
emergence represented a perfect opportunity for a fundamental rethink of contemporary data 
protection law and policy, with some observers proposing that the time was ripe to attempt to 
devise novel approaches to regulation premised on ‘brave new thinking.’10 However, the 
response of European lawmakers and other regulatory bodies has been more measured. This is 
particular well-evidenced by the General Data Protection Regulation, which was supposedly 
drafted with the intention of bringing the European data protection framework into alignment 
with the practical realities of the twenty-first century.11 In particular, in an apparent attempt to 
tackle the challenges posed by big data’s emergence noted above, the Regulation contains 
revised definitions and conceptions of some of the data protection framework’s fundamental 
pillars, such as the concept of personal data itself,12 informed consent13 and the principle of 
data minimization.14 There is reason to suspect that for one reason or another this legislative 
redrafting may be unlikely to achieve its desired objectives, with a variety of concerns now 
being voiced about their rationale and practical workability. An in-depth consideration of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this article. What is extremely significant in respect of the central 
objective of this article, however, is the way in which the Regulation’s reformulation of many 
of the key tenets of the data protection framework appears to be an initiative born out of what 
might be termed conventional policy-making logic. It has been suggested, for instance, that 
they appear to be approaches to reform that have been designed as a means of addressing 
symptoms of the problems posed by big data rather than the underlying causes.15 As a result, 
in even a best case scenario, they may fail to make any successful long-term impact, even if 
some short-term accomplishments are achieved. This is evidently a far cry from the brave new 
thinking that was clamoured for at the point of big data’s initial emergence. What is also 
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significant is that it is increasingly possible to argue that not only will the proposals for data 
protection reform contained within the General Data Protection Regulation likely fail to 
provide adequate answers to big data’s most serious emergent challenges, but that conventional 
or linear approaches to regulation and policy of any form are not well-suited to problems of a 
chronically intricate nature in any circumstances, including those in the field of data 
protection.16 In simple terms, in an age of mystifyingly complex data-driven business models 
and globalization, the ability of European lawmakers to bring about desired data protection 
policy objectives, and to bring the subject matter of data protection law, the use of personal 
data itself, under regulatory control through the use of traditional ‘command and control’, 
rights-based, rule-heavy, legalistic approaches to regulation, has perhaps reached its limit. One 
key general criticism of contemporary policy development, for instance, and one that appears 
to be particularly pertinent in the big data context, is that public policy responses in these forms 
are habitually too linear for the complexity of the issues for which they are devised. Many 
contemporary problems faced by policy makers might in fact be described as so-called 
‘wicked’ problems. These are problems that are highly resistant to solutions, and challenge 
traditional governance structures and the capacity of traditional approaches to policy making 
and regulation.17 Big data appears to be a problem with these characteristics. The obvious 
implication of this assertion being, that if European lawmakers wish to truly engage and grapple 
with the full extent of big data’s emergent regulatory challenges, and develop responses to 
regulatory issues in the ‘brave new thinking’ mould, they must adopt new, non-conventional, 
methodological approaches to policy making. One particular school of methodological 
approaches that may be of use, but one that has hitherto been unexplored in the literature on 
big data and data protection, is that of systems thinking. 
 
C Systems Thinking 
 
In simple terms, systems thinking is a methodological approach to seeing, and talking about, 
reality that helps us better understand and work with systems around us in our everyday 
environment, to influence and improve the quality of our lives. Systems themselves can broadly 
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Impactful Social Policy’, Journal of Future Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2014, pp.61-62. 
be defined as sets of interacting parts – people, cells, or molecules, to give a few examples – 
interconnected in such a way that they produce their own behaviour over time. A system may 
be buffeted, constricted, triggered, or driven by outside forces, but the system’s response to 
these sources is characteristic of itself.18 Systems thinking approaches to problem solving are 
intended to be of benefit in situations where we are confronted by complex problems that 
involve a variety of different actors and have no obvious solutions. By taking a systems 
approach to problems of this character, we allow ourselves to see the whole picture of the issue 
at hand, and raise our thinking to the level at which solutions to multifaceted issues are 
forthcoming. This is something that competing conceptual frameworks do not always 
provide.19 
However, despite what can be considered true systems thinking now being more than 
half a century old,20 it appears that little has filtered down to everyday thinking or indeed policy 
design and implementation. This is perhaps unfortunate, as research in various fields has 
suggested that systems methodologies may have untapped potential in respect of deciphering 
the complexity inherent in many prominent contemporary regulatory challenges worldwide.21 
The obvious question to be asked in the immediate context, therefore, is whether the big data 
policy area is one such area where they may be suitable for deployment. As has been argued 
elsewhere, for a number of compelling reasons it appears, however, that this is a question that 
can be answered in the affirmative.22 In order to examine this notion in greater detail, the next 
logical step is to identify precisely which system thinking methodology, or methodologies, may 
be best suited for deployment in this context. While methodologies like Strategic Assumption 
Surface Testing (SAST)23 and Soft Systems Methodology (SSM)24 were both considered as 
embryonic possibilities for analysis, it is, given its forward-looking nature, the methodology of 
Interactive Planning that was chosen as the focus of this article. 
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20 See, for instance L. Von Bertalanffy, ‘The History and Status of General Systems Theory’, The Academy of 
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24 Ibid. 
D Interactive Planning 
 
Interactive planning, developed and popularized by the American organizational theorist 
Russell Ackoff, is a systems thinking methodology that differs significantly from two more 
commonly used types of planning: reactive and pre-active, the use of which is far more 
common.25 Reactive Planning tends to take the form of tactically oriented, bottom-up planning, 
the main objective of which is to identify existing deficiencies, and devising initiatives to 
eliminate or diminish them on a one-by-one basis. However, in respect of problems that are of 
a deeply complex nature, in the majority of situations it will be ineffective for three notable 
reasons. First, reactive planning is dedicated to the removal of deficiencies. However, when 
dealing with problems of a complex and nonlinear nature, the removal or elimination of one 
deficiency will not automatically result in an overall improvement in situation. In fact, in such 
scenarios it is not uncommon for the removal of individual deficiencies to give rise to 
unintended and undesirable consequences, leading to an overall worsening of the status quo. 
Second, given that Reactive Planning tends to focus on the removal of what one does not want 
rather than preserving or developing what one does want. One who focuses on the past while 
attempting to move into the future would have no control over where one is going.26 Third, and 
perhaps most significantly, the way in which reactive planning tends to approach complex 
issues and challenges within a system in an isolated manner is too simplistic, as the overall 
state and behaviour of the system will often be more than the sum of its constituent parts and 
problems.27 Pre-active planning initiatives, on the other hand, tend to consist of strategically 
oriented, top-down planning initiatives that are made up of two primary components: prediction 
and preparation. Initiatives of this sort are generally based on the assumption that, although the 
future is inherently unpredictable, with good forecasting the system’s future can be controlled. 
Pre-active planning initiatives, therefore, concern themselves with planning for the future, not 
planning the future itself. The limitation in this methodological approach is that the future that 
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manifests in reality is often drastically different from the one that is planned for, meaning that 
in practice very few pre-active plans are carried out to completion.28 Significantly, policy-
making initiatives premised on conventional logic tend to embody these types of approaches.29 
Conversely, Interactive Planning is directed at creating the future, rather than predicting 
it or responding to it. It is premised on the underlying belief that a system’s future depends at 
least as much on what it does between the present and the future as on what is done to it. It is 
a methodological approach to planning, therefore, that consists of the design of a desirable 
present and the selection or invention of ways of approximating it as closely as possible. It 
creates the future by continuously attempting to close the gap between where it is at the present, 
and its desired state. In essence, therefore, the main benefit that may be attributed to the use of 
Interactive Planning is that it can actively facilitate the exploration of better and more desirable 
futures and can help to develop future states of being that are actively sought-after, as opposed 
to growing one that is merely adequate, or even one that is suboptimal.30 As such, if European 
regulators were to make use of Interactive Planning, they would theoretically be well-placed 
to devise regulatory interventions that dissolve emergent problems, rather than resolve them 
and, as a result, it should be possible for them to work towards a system of data protection law 
and policy that is acceptable to all relevant stakeholders. 
Interactive Planning consists of two primary components: the idealization stage and the 
realization stage, each with their own individual sub-components. In the idealization stage, the 
planner is tasked with designing an idealized future for the system that is being planned for 
from scratch. All constraints other than technological feasibility, such as financial or political 
restrictions, are discounted. The prospect of future technological innovations can be taken into 
account, but these must be restricted to what is reasonably believed to be possible. The 
planner’s design, therefore, is an explicit formulation of their conception of the system they 
would create if they were to create or design it exactly as they desired.31 Once an idealized 
vision has been established and agreed upon by consensus, the next step is to begin planning 
how that vision can be achieved: Interactive Planning’s realization stage. Both the idealization 
and realization phases are divisible into six interrelated phases, namely: formulating the mess, 
ends planning, means planning, resource planning, design of implementation, and design of 
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controls. These six phases of interactive planning may not necessarily be carried out in this 
sequence, but they are usually initiated in this order. Because they are strongly interdependent, 
they usually take place simultaneously and interactively. 
 
I Formulating the Mess 
 
Every system is faced with a set of interacting threats and opportunities. This is known as a 
mess. The aim of this stage of planning is to determine how the system would eventually be 
destroyed, or at least severely damaged, if it were to continue behaving as it is currently. 
Identifying the presence of the system’s Achilles heels provides a focus for the planning that 
will later be followed by identifying precisely what undesirable futures must be guarded against 
and avoided if at all possible. Accordingly, the formulation of the mess stage of the Interactive 
Planning process will require the planner to prepare the following: a detailed consideration of 
how the system in question operates at present; an analysis of the characteristics and properties 
of the system that obstruct its progress; a projection of the system’s future assuming that no 
changes are made to existing plans for its future development and the future environment that 
can be expected; and a description of how and why the system would likely be destroyed or 
severely damaged if the above-mentioned projections manifested in practice.32 
 
II Ends Planning 
 
Having formulated the mess, Interactive Planning’s ends planning stage involves the 
development of the idealized design of the system’s future, as mentioned earlier. The planner 
is asked to determine what the system in question would be like in the present, if it could take 
whatever form was desired. In other words, the ends planning stage involves identifying the 
gaps between the idealized design and the state of the system as envisaged during the 
formulation of the mess. Once this has been done, the remainder of the planning process can 
be dedicated to an analysis of how these gaps can be removed or reduced, both collectively and 
interactively.33 
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III Means Planning 
 
The means planning stage involves making determinations in respect of what ought to be done 
to remove or reduce the above-mentioned gaps or barriers, which exist between the ‘mess’ that 
has been formulated and the desired goals identified during the ends planning stage. It is here 
where the planner should select or invent the courses of action, practices, projects, programmes 
and policies that are to be implemented in the pursuit of the system’s idealized redesign.34 
 
IV Resource Planning 
 
The resource planning stage requires the planner to determine what resources will be required 
in order for the means to reach the desired ends to be executed. In particular, it will be important 
at this stage to determine how much of the necessary resources – be they facilities and 
equipment, materials, energy, services, personnel, money, or expertise – will be needed in order 
to implement the means selected.35 
 
V Design Implementation and Control 
 
With all of the above steps addressed, it will then be important to decide upon how any agreed 
courses of action are to be implemented, and how they are to be monitored so to avoid them 
going awry and straying from the desired objectives. In particular it will be important for 
planners to determine precisely who is required to do what, where, and when, and devise 
methods of monitoring implemented planning decisions to determine whether they are 
producing the desired results and, if not, what corrective action ought to be taken.36 Once 
completed, the idealized design and all of the conclusions drawn from the other stages of the 
process should be distributed for comment, criticism, and suggestions to as many relevant 
stakeholders who have not been involved in its preparation as possible. Where possible their 
inputs should then be incorporated into the design. When this is not done, an explanation should 
be provided to those who offered relevant comment, criticism, or suggestions. 
 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
E Applying Interactive Planning to Big Data’s Emergent Policy Challenges 
 
Having outlined why on paper systems methodologies, and particularly Ackoff’s Interactive 
Planning methodology, may be well suited to addressing pressing problems arising in the big 
data and data protection policy area, in terms of both designing and implementing effective 
regulation, the next step is to test this general hypothesis. This section of the article intends to 
demonstrate the precise potential of Interactive Planning as a tool for policy formulation and 
regulatory design, using difficulties surrounding the principle of minimization caused by big 
data’s emergence as a specific case study. 
 
I Formulating the Mess 
 
The principle of data minimization can be considered one of the European data protection 
framework’s fundamental doctrines. The principle requires that the only personal data that 
ought to be collected, stored, and processed are those which are necessary to realize specified 
and legitimate goals, and that all such data held by a data controller should be destroyed once 
they are no longer relevant to the achievement of such goals. This is embodied by Article 6 (c) 
of the Data Protection Directive, which specifies that data must not be ‘excessive’ to the 
purposes for which they are collected. The General Data Protection Regulation, which, as noted 
above, has been drafted specifically to bring the main tenets of the data protection framework 
into alignment with contemporary data-handling practices, retains the principle of data 
minimization as one of its substantive pillars. Notably, Article 5(c) of the Regulation explicitly 
states that any collections of personal data must be limited to ‘what is necessary’ required in 
order for a legitimate processing activity to be carried out. The upshot of these provisions is 
clear: data controllers should refrain from arbitrarily collecting and storing personal data carte 
blanche, and make collections only when strictly necessary for the completion of legitimate 
processing activities. 
The origins and rationale behind the principle can be traced back to the 1970s, where 
concerns began to arise over the collection and processing of data relating to individuals in 
centralized government computers and databases. It was intended to prevent powerful 
organizations from building giant dossiers of information relating to individual persons that 
could then be used for nefarious purposes such as manipulation, profiling, and discrimination. 
The placing of limits on the amount of data that can be gathered and stored was thought to offer 
safeguards against such potential harms. Data cannot, for instance, be lost, stolen, or misused, 
if they have not been collected in the first place. At the time the concept was formulated, 
computing technologies that had the software and processing power to handle large amounts 
of data were in their infancy. Similarly, there were no ways for individuals’ personal data to be 
collected and distributed via an international super network like the Internet.37 However, times 
have changed, and once again, as with a number of other prominent aspects of the European 
data protection framework, the emergence of big data has called into question the principle’s 
practical utility and overall value. 
In general terms there are now considerable doubts in respect of data minimization 
principle’s practical utility, and whether it ought to be retained as a key regulatory principle, 
simply because it increasingly appears that it simply cannot be at all reconciled with the 
practical realities of data gathering and handling practices in the emerging big data 
environment. Simply put, given the fact that many big data analytics operations, and the 
benefits that are likely to stem therefrom, necessarily require the amassment of huge quantities 
of data, big data and the principle of data minimization simply cannot be aligned with one 
another. In any event, as noted above, the amount of data generated, gathered, compiled, and 
processed in the world in a year is growing at a phenomenal rate, and shows no sign of 
abating.38 At the very least, therefore, there appears to be a considerable discrepancy between 
what is said on the statute book and what is happening in practice, with seemingly no prospect 
of the situation being reversed. Accordingly, it seems safe to conclude, that whichever way it 
is looked at, the principle simply does not work in practice in the big data environment. The 
‘mess’ we are able to formulate here, therefore, is the fact that the operation of a fundamental 
tenet of the European data protection framework is manifestly sub-optimal, and possibly 
entirely unfit for purpose. This is severely problematic as systems of law and regulation that 
do not work as they should, or those which are not enforced in any meaningful way, will run 
the risk of appearing illegitimate and, in effect, not worth the paper they are written on. As has 
been widely noted elsewhere, a perceived lack of legitimacy is one of the primary reasons for 
which, historically, numerous high-profile and wide-ranging regulatory regimes have collapsed 
into failure.39 This is clearly, therefore, a policy challenge that is in urgent need of response. 
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 II Ends Planning 
 
The preceding section outlined how the emergence of big data has raised significant questions 
as to the practical utility and worth of the principle of data minimization, a central tenet of the 
European data protection framework. Having identified that this is the ‘mess’ that is in need of 
address, the next step is to attempt to design a desirable end or ends. In other words, before 
attempting to address how problems facing the data minimization principle might be addressed, 
we must ask the question, what are the end goals we must now strive towards, and what sort of 
big data regulatory environment do we want to have moving forward? In order to answer this 
question, it is first useful to take a brief trip down memory lane, and consider the emergence 
of data protection law as a distinct field of legal practice. 
Regulatory concerns pertaining to the use of information technologies and, in particular, 
the way in which they allow information relating to individuals to be handled and used, have 
materialized repeatedly, almost systematically, throughout history. The emergence of the first 
handheld cameras in the late nineteenth century, for instance, made it possible to capture 
peoples’ images, and spawned concerns about media intrusions into their private lives.40 Half 
a century later, leaps forward in computing technologies generated further worries about 
information technology’s inherent harmful potential. The trend of increased apprehensiveness 
linked to the computerized processing of information experienced greater acceleration in the 
1970s as mainframe computers became pervasively used by organizations in advanced 
economies.41 The emergence of the Internet, and later the World Wide Web in the 1990s, and 
their inherent possibility for the monitoring and analysis of data relating to individuals further 
fanned the flames that had already been lit under the above-mentioned concerns, and was one 
of the contributing factors that led to the enactment of Europe-wide data protection laws 
designed, in part at least, to guard against the negative consequences that could potentially stem 
from the use of these technologies.42 
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What is noteworthy for the purposes of our present discussion, however, is the fact that 
not only were these issues significant in years gone by, but, due to the emergence of big data, 
they are now more salient and in need of discussion than ever before. This appears to be true 
for a number of reasons. As noted above, big data analytics operations often involve using the 
personal data of individuals to build sophisticated statistical models, which can then be 
exploited to derive information and construct profiles relating to the individuals to whom those 
data relate. While this may lead to benefits for said individuals, such analyses may cause 
significant aspects of their life and interests to be revealed, or inferred, possibly incorrectly, 
and the results may be used to make important decisions about them without their knowledge.43 
This in turn, could have the potential to lead to individuals being inadvertently or deliberately 
excluded from making use of certain services or from pursuing certain possibilities.44 Not only 
do many big data analytics operations necessarily generalize, make broad predictive 
assumptions, and stereotype individuals based on their choices and circumstances, but they 
facilitate and encourage inequality by creating an environment where individuals are treated 
differently based on their profiles.45 The ostracism and stigmatization this could allow, in 
respect of individuals belonging to minority groups in particular, could, therefore, increase and 
generate an explicit loss of freedom.46 In addition to the possibilities for direct discrimination, 
targeted advertising and marketing endeavours that are often the result of big data analytics 
operations may also give rise to other indirect harms, namely the subtle influencing of 
individual behaviours. This is perhaps best illustrated by the now famous example of the US 
Target Superstore, which analysed its customers’ purchasing behaviour to, among other things, 
identify customers in the early stages of pregnancy, and adjust their advertising and marketing 
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endeavours in light of such discoveries.47 This example precisely demonstrates how analytics 
and profiling-based advertising and marketing operations can be used to target specific 
individuals at critical or highly sensitive points in their lives, when their behaviour is in flux 
and new habits are formed.48 Such is the invasiveness and potential impact of these activities 
that it has been suggested that they may have the potential to undermine individuals in respect 
of their shopping and purchasing decisions, which could have serious consequential effects in 
terms of important life decisions more generally.49 
By looking at some of the major developments in information technology that have 
occurred over the course of the last century, as well as taking a specific look at some of big 
data’s latent potential harms and concerns, we can see that personal data, and the technologies 
that utilize such data, have throughout history repeatedly been a prime concern to regulators 
and policy makers at both national and supranational levels. Crucially, we can see that the 
concerns surrounding the processing of personal data first voiced in mid- to late twentieth 
century are every bit as relevant in the present as they were in days gone by. Such are the 
extensive possibilities that are now inherent in the processing of personal data, the dangers of 
abuses, and the consequences of such abuses, are more extensive and potentially severe than at 
any other point in recorded history. The rationale for the principle of purpose limitation – the 
desire to guard against abuses stemming from the processing of personal data – therefore, 
remains defensible and highly salient. One desirable end that we can immediately identify from 
our deliberations thus far, therefore, is the necessity of constructing and maintaining a system 
of data protection regulation that affords individuals a high degree of protection against 
potential abuses that may stem from the processing of their personal data. 
This, however, is only one side of the proverbial coin. As noted above, when attempting 
to deploy Interactive Planning, we must be reminded of the fact that one of the methodology’s 
central facets is taking account of the viewpoints of a variety of relevant stakeholders. While 
the development of a system of law and regulation that ascribes individuals a high level of data 
protection and protects them from abuses stemming from the processing of their personal data 
will be desirable to some stakeholders, notably said individuals themselves, other stakeholders, 
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notably private companies and other firms heavily involved in the analysis of big data, will 
inevitably have other, possibly competing, interests. In particular, large multinational firms 
whose business models are based on the gathering and in-depth analysis of data, such as 
Google, or research institutions whose research is reliant on the analysis of big data, are 
unlikely to be receptive to the introduction of high levels of individual data protection if any 
such measures have the impact of unduly and negatively impacting on their data analytics 
operations. Accordingly, the construction of a big data regulatory regime that excessively 
restricts economic uses of personal data is something that must be avoided if the views of all 
relevant stakeholders are to be taken into account. 
When taking all of the above factors into consideration, it would appear that the ‘end’ 
that is most desirable in the context of designing data protection law and policy in a world of 
big data is the construction of a regulatory environment in which individuals are afforded 
meaningful safeguards and protection against abuses stemming from the processing of their 
personal data, but simultaneously, an environment that does not unduly restrict and impede 
legitimate specified uses of those data by others whether such uses are of a commercial, 
economic, or research-related nature. Having recognized this, we must now identify the barriers 
that are standing in the way of the achievement of this goal. This, however, appears to be a 
relatively straightforward task. Quite simply, in the big data environment, such is the enormity 
of the volume of information generated, gathered, and analysed, nobody knows when, in what 
form, and with whom, individuals share their personal data. This is unsatisfactory to all relevant 
stakeholders. To the individual, this uncertainty is reflective of a growing inability to control 
and exercise autonomy over their personal data, as well as being reflective of the inability of 
regulators to provide them with meaningful data protection rights, which they can invoke 
against other parties who may seek to use their personal data in nefarious ways. If data 
protection law is to provide individuals with relief against potential abuses, for instance, it is 
surely a prerequisite that the said individuals must be able to identify those against whom they 
can pursue a remedy. To private firms and other organizations engaged in big data analytics 
operations, on the other hand, this uncertainty has fostered a culture of mistrust between them 
and the individuals whose personal data they seek. This, in turn, has prevented them from 
reaping the full benefits of their data gathering and processing activities.50 It would seem, 
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therefore, that the ‘barrier’ that must be removed if the interests of both individuals and other 
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III Means Planning 
 
As noted above, the most significant barrier that stands in the way of the achievement of the 
desirable ‘end’ of constructing a big data regulatory framework in which individuals enjoy a 
high level of data protection appears to be the fact that, due to the enormity of all the data 
collections and processing activities that occur in the big data environment, nobody knows 
precisely who shares which data with whom, and when and under what circumstances sharing 
occurs. The data minimization principle, despite the apparent flaws in its practical application, 
was designed precisely to prevent the manifestation of this sort of situation. One obvious way 
in which the above-mentioned problems associated with the data minimization principle could 
potentially be addressed, therefore, would be to try and resurrect the principle, and breathe new 
life into it, so that it would be able to function more smoothly in conjunction with contemporary 
data-handling practices. A revised version of the principle that was worded more tightly, for 
instance, might represent one possible way in which this could be attempted. It is difficult to 
see, however, how such endeavours could ever be successful. Surely no amount of clever 
reformulation of the principle could ever reconcile the very notion of restricting or reducing 
the amount or volume of data that are gathered with the enormous quantities of personal data 
that are currently collected in the world today, a trend that has effectively become established 
as a norm both online and in other key areas of big data’s application. Alternatively, regulators 
could seek to breathe new life into the principle by way of introducing improved standards in 
an attempt to encourage minimal data collections, or more robustly enforce the principle by 
way of introducing stricter penal sanctions to be levied against parties whose collections are 
deemed to be excessive. Again, however, this would likely end in failure. Against the 
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background of such proposals we must be reminded of the fact that enormous data gatherings 
in the big data environment have essentially become established as a cultural and societal norm. 
Any regulatory initiative that has the effect of clashing with that norm will surely be met with 
resistance, not only from parties such as big data analytics firms, whose day-to-day activities 
rely on the acquisition and analysis of data, but possibly also from individuals.51 What is 
significant in this regard is, as noted above, regulatory endeavours, which clash with 
established cultural and societal norms due to difficulties in ensuring compliance and 
enforcement, frequently end in failure.52 For these reasons, so far as using regulatory 
endeavours to protect individuals from abuses by actually limiting personal data collections is 
concerned, quite frankly, the proverbial wheels may have been turned too far for them to be 
turned back. 
However, while the goal of limiting data collections may be unattainable, as noted 
above, the rationale behind the purpose of limitation principle remains desirable, and there is 
likely to be more than one way of skinning the proverbial cat. Simply put, there are a number 
of prospective ways in which the data minimization principle’s rationale of guarding against 
abuses stemming from large-scale data collections can be put into action. One promising and 
novel way in which this might be done would be to shift the existing regulatory framework to 
a sui generis model of data protection, which targeted certain uses of personal data rather than 
their collection. For instance, such a regime might prohibit certain data processing activities in 
certain circumstances (e.g., if the processing of certain types of personal data in a certain 
context, such as consumer profiling, was likely to lead to discriminatory or otherwise harmful 
outcomes), or mandate that certain processing activities may only be permitted if adequate legal 
or technical safeguards were put in place to ensure any injurious consequences could be 
avoided. In the event that their personal data were used in a way that fell outside the scope of 
what the law permitted, individuals would be able to identify when and where their personal 
data were used in ways that were undesirable or unlawful, and seek immediate legal redress. 
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Regulators, therefore, could step up their monitoring of personal data usage without having to 
worry about the collection of those data, meaning that in effect, the principle of data 
minimization could effectively be retired. Accordingly, a shift to a sui generis model of data 
protection could theoretically allow for the problems associated with the data minimization 
principle’s shortcomings to be dissolved rather than resolved and thus, accordingly, there is an 
emerging consensus among various commentators that such a move would appear to have 
considerable promise.53 
A shift to a model of data protection of this sort, however, would not be straightforward. 
The most obvious challenge is that a model of data protection premised on regulating data uses 
rather than one reliant on fair information principles as is the case with the existing model, is 
that it would still necessarily require individuals to have a knowledge and understanding of 
other parties holding their personal data, and how and why those data were being processed. 
If, for instance, individuals are not able to discern when, where, and by whom their personal 
data is being processed, they would never meaningfully be able to invoke new explicit rules 
regarding data processing activities and seek a remedy in the event their personal data were 
being misused. Accordingly, the question that now arises is, if restricting the volume of data 
collections that occur in the big data environment is not a feasible way in which the 
understanding of individuals can be enhanced in respect of which parties hold their personal 
data, as well as how they use those data, what other avenues can be identified as a means of 
achieving the same objective? 
Another occasionally mooted suggestion is the introduction of increased transparency 
obligations, backed by law, that would be imposed on parties that make use of personal data.54 
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model of data protection in the manner outlined above may help address some of the most severe problems 
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54 The General Data Protection Regulation for instance, places a number of new transparency obligations on 
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Legally requiring such parties to present their processing activities to persons whose personal 
data were involved in commonly understood language, for instance, ought to contribute to the 
development of a more robust understanding of how personal data are used in the big data 
environment, allowing for individuals to more effectively invoke their data protection rights if 
the need arose. The immediate, and likely fundamental, problem that can be identified in 
relation to such initiatives, however, is the fact that there is reason to suspect that it may, in 
fact, be virtually impossible, given their inherent complexity, to explain the intricacies and 
likely consequences of many big data analytics operations in plain language notices that are 
understandable to ordinary people.55 If this is the case, any attempt to rectify the above-
mentioned uncertainty and lack of lucidity in the big data environment by way of heightened 
transparency rules and obligations will be a complete non-starter. 
However, a more promising way forward might be found in the source of all the trouble, 
that is to say, technology itself. Though technologies themselves tend not to be habitually 
thought of as widely accepted ways by which desired regulatory objectives can be secured,56 
the last few years have seen the emergence of, and huge developments in, what have been 
termed Personal Information Management Services.57 These can broadly be described as 
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56 There is, in fact, some debate as to whether technological tools should ever be used as a means of securing 
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57 A 2014 report by the market analyst Ctrl-Shift estimated the value of the PIMS market to be in excess of 
£16bn, with new forms of relevant services emerging every week. Ctrl-Shift, ‘Personal Information 
technological tools designed to help individuals collect, control, monitor, and use their personal 
data for their own purposes and make better decisions in respect of the use of those data by 
others. Given their purpose and rationale, it has been suggested that these types of services 
have the potential to have far-reaching consequences in respect of how individuals and other 
parties seeking their personal data interact with one another and, in particular, make significant 
inroads into reducing problems linked to the inability of the individual to keep track of their 
personal data in the big data environment. Though Personal Information Management Services 
come in a variety of forms, two types that are particularly salient in the immediate context are 
personal data stores and transparency-enhancing technologies. 
Personal data stores are technological platforms that allow individuals themselves, as 
opposed to private organizations and other third parties, to store, manage, and deploy their data 
in a secure and structured way. They typically provide individuals with a means by which they 
can visualize their personal data, and functional mechanisms by which they can exercise 
determinations in respect of with whom particular aspects of those data are shared, at which 
times, how they are used, and for what purposes. These features and functions are encompassed 
by a definition offered by O’Hara and Van Kleek, who explain personal data stores 
accordingly: 
 
A personal data store is a set of capabilities built into a software programme or service 
that allows an individual to manage and maintain his or her digital information, artefacts 
and assets, longitudinally and self-sufficiently, so it may be used practically when and 
where it can for the individual’s benefit as perceived by the individual, and shared with 
others directly, without relying on external third parties.58 
 
Personal data stores can come in a variety of guises. Some take the form of cloud-based 
intermediary platforms that collect and integrate data from numerous other online services on 
behalf of individuals. Others can be installed locally on devices or servers operated by the 
individuals themselves. Some personal data stores are intended to be of general purpose, while 
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others are more specific and confine themselves to dealing with particular types of data or offer 
a specific type of functionality.59 Most, however, rely on the principles and standards of the 
architecture of the World Wide Web due to the way in which it provides a flexible platform for 
the development of highly interoperable network-based systems.60 This reliance is in no small 
part due to recent advancements in technologies and protocols, which have made it easier than 
ever to integrate social features into diverse Web applications than at any other point in the 
Web’s history.61 From a technical perspective a personal data store typically operates in the 
following way. After an individual decides to install, or otherwise access and make use of, a 
personal data store service, they will then be provided with their own personal data store, which 
will then house their personal data in one central location. The user, as the central point of 
control, with a touch of a button, will then be able to make a determination as to when, which, 
and how much of their personal data they wish to share with other parties.62 Accordingly, 
because of this functionality the individual will be far better equipped to monitor the location 
of their data, the identity of the parties that hold them, and what they are being used for. 
It is precisely because of the heightened level of control personal data store services 
purport to offer that they have been identified as being capable of providing an alternative and 
more sophisticated approach to previously observed models of data management technologies; 
this control has led to them increasingly being talked about in both academic and commercial 
environments as a means through which the above-mentioned dearth of knowledge surrounding 
information streams and data flows in the big data environment can be remedied.63 Others have 
gone even further, suggesting that not only do personal data stores represent a likely or possible 
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way of doing this, but that they may be the only way to liberate individuals from a ‘toxic’ 
environment where unseen and unaccountable data barons have a monopoly on the control and 
understanding of their personal data.64 While the idea of individuals being given a controlling 
stake in the administration of their personal data is far from new, it is increasingly propounded 
that only recently we have arrived at a point where the notion has become technologically 
feasible.65 While many personal data store services are still in development, they are already 
widely believed to have considerable promise so far as allowing individuals to develop an 
understanding of how their personal data are collected and used by others in the big data 
environment is concerned.66 To take a few notable prominent examples, MyDex,67 CPDS,68 
TAMIAS,69 Avoco PDS,70 and the Hub of all Things (HAT)71 – all provide online platforms 
from which individuals are able to manually enter aspects of their personal data, visualize those 
data, and negotiate fine-grained data sharing agreements, allowing them to determine precisely 
which third parties are granted access to specific aspects of their personal data on a one-by-one 
basis. In a similar vein, openPDS/SafeAnswers provides comparable services for an 
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individual’s personal metadata, which tends to be observed and inferred rather than volunteered 
by the infidel themselves.72 
In contrast to personal data stores and other similar technological tools that purport to 
give individuals greater influence in respect of how their personal data are shared with, and 
used by, others, transparency-enhancing technologies are not concerned with enhancing 
individual control. Instead, their objective is to provide the user with a greater understanding 
of how their personal data are stored, exchanged, processed, and used by others.73 In other 
words, they are tools capable of providing the individual with clear visibility in respect of the 
use of their personal data.74 Like personal data stores, transparency-enhancing technologies can 
come in a variety of forms. Some types, commonly known as data provenance tools,75 for 
instance, provide the individual with greater insight into the data they have disclosed to another 
party. Others, on the other hand, attempt to provide a better comprehension of the way other 
parties attempt to use the personal data of an individual.76 It is not difficult to see, therefore, 
how both varieties of these types of tool could have the potential to help alleviate the currently 
observable dearth of knowledge and understanding of information and data flows in the big 
data environment. Again, as with personal data stores, however, the potential of transparency-
enhancing technologies is not merely a paper possibility. There are, in fact, a range of 
established and emerging tools of this type whose effectiveness and potential has been borne 
out by empirical findings. For instance, the so-called ‘sticky policies’ can allow for personal 
data to be effectively watermarked and which could prevent certain types of processing 
activities, and allow for the usage of such data to be monitored even after the individual has 
agreed to impart with them.77 Similarly, dynamic taint analysis tools, which allow individuals 
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to track their personal data in real time, such as TaintDroid and DiOS, have been shown to be 
able to successfully monitor and trace personal data individuals share through smartphones and 
mobile applications, even after such data have left the individual’s device and been passed on 
to other parties.78 In a similar mould, XRay, a personal data tracking system developed by 
Columbia Engineering, allows individuals to monitor which of their personal data, such as data 
found in emails, web searches, and viewed products, are being used to target them in a 
particular way (i.e., through targeted advertisements, pricing schemes, or the provision, or lack 
of provision, of particular goods or services).79 While XRay is at the time of writing a prototype 
tool, empirical findings strongly suggest that it is of considerable promise, and demonstrate 
that the development and construction of scalable transparency architectures that can be used 
across huge networks, such as the entire World Wide Web, is most definitely achievable.80 
Though many technological platforms and tools in the mould of those considered here 
are, as noted above, still at their developmental stages, there is a growing body of research that 
suggests that their progress and success to date is encouraging, and that they will be capable of 
dispelling some of the uncertainties currently surrounding data flows and information streams 
in the big data environment. Accordingly, the widespread deployment of such tools would 
likely benefit all major stakeholders in the big data environment in which there existed a sui 
generis model of data protection law. For instance, to the individual, the widespread adoption 
and deployment of these technologies would provide them with a means by which they could 
more effectively exercise their data protection rights against parties responsible for 
inappropriate uses of their personal data. To other major parties, like big data analytics firms 
and research organizations, the widespread adoption and deployment of these technologies 
would, due to the heightened sense of security and data protection they provided to individuals, 
help generate a sense of trust between them and the individuals whose personal data they 
sought, resulting in increased levels of data sharing and, accordingly allowing them to more 
fully reap the benefits of their data analyses. For these reasons there is a growing body of 
opinion that suggests they ought to be incorporated into prospective data protection regimes 
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looking forward.81 This article fully endorses this sentiment. If we are to accept that 
technological tools are a likely means by which desired regulatory objectives in the big data 
environment can be delivered, however, the question which then arises, therefore, is in what 
way should they be incorporated into prospective big data regulatory environments, and what 
role should the law play in their incorporation? One possibility that can immediately be 
dismissed is the idea of the law mandatorily imposing obligations on organizations that engage 
in big data analytics operations to incorporate specific technological tools and make them 
available to the individuals whose personal data they make use of. As has been noted 
extensively elsewhere, for instance, technology and the development thereof moves at a far 
greater pace than the law will ever be able to.82 The implication being, of course, that the 
introduction of any legal requirement that imposed the use of specific technological tools on 
organizations engaged in big data analytics would run the risk of becoming rapidly outdated. 
For these reasons alone, such a course should not be pursued. 
An alternative way forward that appears to be manifestly more promising, is the rollout 
of new standards, and a list of regulator-endorsed best available tools and practices, backed by 
law. The new standards could, for instance, denote scoring systems in respect of certain types 
of big data analytics operations and other associated data processing activities, with high scores 
being awarded to processing activities that involved particularly sensitive types of personal 
data, such as religious affiliations and health data, or to processing activities that were capable 
of having serious consequences for the individual whose personal data were involved, with 
comparatively lower scores being given to more routine processing activities, the consequences 
of which were deemed to be less severe. Following this, organizations and parties undertaking 
big data analytics operations could then have a variety of obligations placed on them depending 
on the aggregate score awarded to them as a result of the processing activities for which they 
were responsible, including, in certain situations, the mandatory deployment and incorporation 
of technological tools that allow individuals to either exercise greater control over their 
personal data, or develop a greater understanding of how they were being used. In a similar 
vein, the score awarded would correlate with a score awarded to technological tools considered 
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and ranked in a list of best available tools and practices, agreed upon by a consensus of all 
European data protection authorities. Accordingly, to use a hypothetical example, a big data 
analytics firm whose data processing operations involved sensitive personal data, or were likely 
to lead to significant consequences for the individuals whose data were involved, would likely 
be awarded a high score, and thus might be required to incorporate relevant technological tools, 
be they of the personal data store, transparency enhancing, or other variety, of their choice, 
from the list of best tools and practices which aligned with that score. In so doing, this would 
in effect provide individuals sharing their data with such organizations with a means by which 
they could effectively monitor their personal data and allow them to invoke legal safeguards 
and rules in the event their personal data were misused. So to ensure that the relevant standards 
and best available techniques were obeyed and effectively enforced, the law would impose 
severe penalties against those who ignored them, as well as against those found to have illegally 
acquired, possessed, used, or sold personal data. So to be made meaningful, firms and 
organizations that score highly would also be subject to routine audits and monitoring, for 
which data protection authorities of each Member State would be responsible, to ensure that 
they were fulfilling their responsibilities. Alongside this, the rollout of digital literacy 
educational initiatives would also be required, so that individuals in the big data regulatory 
environment were not only made aware of the existence of the technological empowerment 
tools that may aid in enhancing the protection of their personal data, but so that they are able 
to operate them competently and, in so doing, prevent manifestation of security 
vulnerabilities.83 
The result of these combined endeavours ought to be the construction of a system of 
data protection law and regulation that allows the alleviation of the current dearth of knowledge 
and understanding of data sharing and handling practices in the big data environment. 
Accordingly, they could pave the way for a successful shift to a sui generis model of data 
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protection, which, as noted above, would target certain uses of personal data, rather than their 
collection, negating the need for a data minimization principle. In so doing, by following these 
steps, it should be possible to enact a system of data protection law and regulation that 
resembled the desired ‘ends’ identified above inasmuch as it would afford individuals with 
meaningful safeguards against potential abuses, allowing them to enjoy a heightened level of 
data protection while, concurrently, the free flow of personal data in the internal market would 
not be unduly restricted. 
 
IV Resource Planning 
 
As noted above, the resource planning stage requires the determination of what resources will 
be required in order for the identified means to reach the desired ends. As also noted above, 
when undertaking the ends and means phases of any deployment of Interactive Planning, 
financial constraints should generally not act as an impediment to the identification and 
achievement of desired goals. While an exact figure of the likely costs that would be incurred 
as a result of the construction of a big data regulatory environment as envisaged above would 
be extremely complicated to calculate, and such a calculation was beyond the scope of the 
research that this article is based on, it is still possible to advance some comment on the 
resources that would likely be required. 
General administrative uncertainty aside, it seems certain that the construction of a sui 
generis model of data protection as a part of a wider big data regulatory environment, in the 
manner outlined above, would be fairly resource intensive. This is true in respect of both 
technological development and regulatory oversight. For instance, in order for technological 
empowerment tools to continue to be developed at a rate that keeps pace with the evolution of 
data sharing practices and analytical techniques, so that they remain functional and fit for 
purpose, funding will evidently be required.84 Any public education initiatives that are required 
in order for the relevant technological tools to be operated effectively will obviously also 
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require funding. The administrative upheaval of moving from a model of data protection based 
on fair information principles to a one that is of a sui generis character would also surely incur 
substantial costs, many of which would probably be unforeseeable. At the same time, it is 
widely acknowledged at present that data protection authorities in many EU Member States 
are already perceived to be worryingly underfunded.85 As has been noted elsewhere, however, 
the construction of any wide-ranging regulatory regime that places rigorous monitoring 
responsibilities on such bodies, or extends those that are already in place, will inevitably require 
their funding to be drastically stepped up.86 
 
V Design Implementation and Control 
 
Having outlined the main features of the regulatory model designed in the article’s preceding 
sections, the final stage of the Interactive Planning process now requires that the way in which 
the desired design is to be implemented and controlled also be outlined. Though, as with the 
resource planning stage of the Interactive Planning procedure, the process of shifting to a sui 
generis model of data protection from the model based on fair information principles in place 
currently would undoubtedly require a great deal of administrative and logistical upheaval, 
such as the enactment of new legislation, with many of the associated challenges not being 
foreseeable in advance, and are thus beyond the scope of this article’s research. Nevertheless, 
as with the resource planning stage, it is once again possible to advance some specific 
comments in respect of design implementation and control. 
First of all, as outlined in the preceding sections, a shift to a sui generis model of data 
protection in the manner envisaged above would require the drafting of fresh and novel 
standards, and the compilation and maintenance of a list of best available technological tools 
and practices. These should be the result of discussions between the European Commission, 
national data protection authorities, technological experts, and other relevant regulatory bodies 
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like the Article 29 Working Party. The maintenance and updating of these standards must be a 
continuous process, and thus it will be vital that they are periodically reviewed and considered 
against the background of the development of data-handling practices in the big data 
environment, so to ensure that they remain fit for purpose, and do not fall into obsolescence. 
In a similar vein, it will be vital that research and development in relation to technological 
empowerment tools is also continued, so that they too can keep pace with the ever-changing 
practical realities of the big data environment, and remain fit for purpose for inclusion on the 
above-mentioned list of best available technological tools and practices. The manifestation of 
any potential security or user safety issues must also be continually monitored. 
Once in place, it will be vital that the data protection authorities of member states 
identify and carry out regulator auditing exercises on private companies and other 
organizations that are responsible for analytical operations that are adjudged to be deserving of 
regulatory attention. The purposes of these exercises must be to ensure that the audited parties 
are fully meeting the obligations imposed by them by the relevant standards and best practices. 
Again, ascertaining the level of obligations imposed on organizations that involve themselves 
in big data analytics operations must be a continuous process to ensure any such obligations 
are commensurate to the data processing activities for which they are responsible. 
 
F Conclusions and Thoughts for Further Research 
 
This article has, by considering the emergent challenges posed by big data to the smooth 
operation of the principle of purpose limitation, attempted to make the argument that systems 
thinking methodologies and, in particular, Interactive Planning, as popularized by Ackoff, are 
capable of playing a key role in the development of data protection law and policy in the big 
data environment. To this end, the result of the above analyses is the presentation of a policy 
response to the challenges posed by big data to data protection law’s principle of data 
minimization, which, it is argued, is well-researched, credible, and conceivable. By using an 
Interactive Planning approach, it was possible to consider the underlying challenges posed to 
the principle by big data’s emergence, consider the views of a number of relevant stakeholders, 
devise a desirable end goal, devise a means by which barriers restricting the achievement of 
this goal could be removed, and devise a means by which the identified plan could be 
implemented. The primary conclusion of the analyses undertaken was that the European data 
protection framework might best be served by shifting to a model of data protection that focuses 
on certain uses of personal data, underpinned by personal empowerment technologies and new 
legal rules, and move away from the current model, which is based on fair information 
principles and focuses on the collection of such data. In this new model of data protection, 
individuals would be afforded with meaningful technological and legal safeguards against 
potential abuses stemming from the processing of their personal data, allowing them to enjoy 
a heightened level of data protection while, concurrently, the free flow of personal data in the 
internal market would not be unduly restricted. In so doing, the article sketched a plausible and 
potentially promising prospective way in which above-mentioned problems facing the 
principle of data minimization can be dissolved, rather than resolved, and a desirable future 
pursued. As noted at the article’s outset, however, it was not the purpose of this article to 
present a definitive solution to this particular policy challenge, nor any others posed by the 
emergence of big data. Instead, the objective of this article was to highlight the potential of 
Interactive Planning as a methodological means of improving data protection law and policy 
in the big data environment during both development and implementation stages. By using the 
principle of data minimization and its associated challenges as a particular case study and, by 
subjecting these challenges to the Interactive Planning methodology, allowing for the 
development of potentially promising prospective ways forward, it is tentatively argued that 
this objective has been achieved. 
The principle of data minimization is, however, just one particular aspect of data 
protection law where the emergence of big data requires policy responses, and arguably a re-
gearing of long established regulatory principles and maxims. There are other pressing policy 
areas associated with big data’s emergence and the resultant effects on European data 
protection law. Notably, and as alluded to above, for instance, there are serious concerns 
associated with the suitability of continued reliance on at least two other facets central to the 
data protection framework, namely: informed consent and the concept of personal data itself. 
In light of this, there is clearly ample scope to examine how systems methodologies, including 
those other than Interactive Planning, can help with emergent policy challenges in these areas, 
and possibly beyond. In relation to the particular ‘solutions’ proposed in this article, there is 
also clearly ample scope for more research to be undertaken in relation to the types of personal 
empowerment technologies considered above, and precisely how it is they may be capable of 
contributing to the achievement of regulatory objectives in the big data environment. 
 
